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We find that wealthier and more educated immigrants are more likely to make use of 
basic banking services and other formal financial services.  Holding these (and other) 
factors constant, we find immigrants from countries with more effective institutions are 
more likely to have a relationship with a bank and use formal financial markets more 
extensively.  Institutional quality appears to be an important factor in both determining 
both the breadth and the depth of financial access.  It can explain approximately 17 
percent of the country-of-origin-level variation in bank account usage among immigrants 
in the U.S., after other characteristics, including wealth, education and income, are 
controlled for.  Institutional quality is even more important for explaining more extensive 
participation in financial markets, accounting for 27 percent of the analogous variation.  
We examine various measures of institutional effectiveness and are careful to control for 




                                                 
1 We thank the Russell Sage Foundation for their support of this research and Shirley Chiu for excellent 
research assistance.  Please address all correspondence to Anna Paulson, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 
230 S. LaSalle Street, Chicago, IL 60604-1413; phone: (312) 322 2169, email: anna.paulson@chi.frb.org.  
The views presented in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago.   2
1. Introduction 
 
There is a growing interest in understanding what determines the availability and the 
usage of financial services in both developing and developed countries.  Even among 
developed countries, there is significant variation in the fraction of individuals who use 
financial services.  In the U.S., a significant subset of the population makes little use of 
even basic financial services.  Between 10 to 25% of individuals in the U.S. have neither 
a savings nor a checking account.
2  Participation in retirement savings and stock markets 
is even lower.  In Sweden, Germany and Canada the fraction of people without a bank 
account is much lower than in the U.S, closer to 3 percent.  Although the data is sparse, in 
some developing countries the norm is to be without a bank account.  Approximately 
75% of households in Mexico lack and account as do 90% of Kenyans.
3  Since financial 
markets provide important tools for enhancing welfare – tools to transfer resources across 
time and across states of the world, to make payments, to mitigate risk and to fund 
investments -- low rates of participation may be associated with lower welfare. 
 
This paper examines the determinants of financial market participation among 
immigrants in the U.S., examining the role of both individual level determinants like 
wealth and education as well as the effect of the country of origin institutional 
environment.  In contrast to our earlier work on stock market participation (Osili and 
Paulson, 2005), this paper is concerned with two more fundamental aspects of financial 
market participation: breadth and depth.  Financial breadth is equal to one if an individual 
has any relationship with a bank (a savings or a checking account).  The second measure, 
financial depth, captures how many of the functions of financial markets the individual 
uses: safe savings products (saving accounts or certificates of deposit), payment services 




One important reason for being concerned with both the breadth and the depth of 
financial market participation is the extensive literature that shows that better developed 
financial markets lead to improved conditions at the country level.  This literature uses 
cross-country data to show that financial development accelerates growth, decreases 
poverty and reduces inequality.  See for example, Rajan and Zingales (1998), Levine 
(2005), Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2004), and Clarke, Xu and Zou (2003).  In 
addition, other papers show that greater financial development allows firms and 
individuals to realize growth opportunities and to take advantage of new technologies 
(Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, forthcoming).  Finally, financial development allows 
                                                 
2 The exact estimate depends on the dataset.  The Survey of Consumer Finances delivers estimates closer to 
10%, while the 1996 – 2000 Survey of Income and Program Participation data that we analyze produces 
estimates closer to 25%. 
3 Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Peria (2005) 
4 We do not examine usage of insurance products explicitly.  However, financial depth measure is likely to 
capture the ability of an individual to use financial markets to smooth consumption.  Entrepreneurial 
activity would be an alternative way to measure financial depth.  However, there are not enough self-
employed immigrants in the SIPP data to distinguish “entrepreneurs”, who may need to raise capital, from 
individuals whose self-employment is an informal alternative to a wage paying job.       3
firms to operate on a larger scale and encourages asset allocation and eases entry of new 
firms (Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2004)). 
 
Our work is also related to the a growing number of studies show that the ability of a 
country’s institutions to protect private property and to provide incentives for investment 
can explain a large fraction of the persistent disparity in financial development and 
economic performance across countries.  These studies include Knack and Keefer (1995), 
La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 2000), Levine (1998, 1999), Levine, Loayza and Beck 
(2000), Rajan and Zingales (2003), Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003a, 2003b), 
Açemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001 and 2002) and Açemoglu and Johnson (2005).
5  
In addition, Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2002) present evidence that, not only do 
high quality institutions contribute to economic development – institutions are, in fact, 
the key determinant of economic development.   
 
We focus our attention on U.S. immigrants for several reasons.  First, immigrants are a 
large and growing segment of the U.S. population.  Second, international migration 
allows us to study the impact of placing an individual into a different formal institutional 
environment while holding past experience with institutions fixed.  In the process of 
migrating from one country to another, individuals move from one formal institutional 
environment to another but may maintain beliefs about institutions acquired in their 
countries of origin.  This allows us to explore the importance of the second component of 
North’s (1990) definition of institutions: “formal constraints – rules that human beings 
devise” and “informal constraints – such as conventions and rules of behavior.”  By 
studying the behavior of international migrants in the U.S., we isolate the impact of 
informal institutional constraints, since all of the migrants face the same set of formal 
rules in the U.S.
6  Understanding the role of informal institutional constraints is a crucial 
component of predicting the impact of formal institutional change.   
 
In addition, by studying immigrants in the U.S. we retain some of the interesting diversity 
of a cross-country study, but eliminate some confounding factors.  To a first 
approximation, studying immigrants in the U.S. controls for factors that impact the 
supply of financial services across countries.  For example, all of the immigrants whose 
behavior we study face the same competitive environment; make decisions in the same 
regulatory environment; are subject to the same legal structure, the same infrastructure 
and so on.
7  We focus our attention on how the experience of these supply factors in the 
country of origin manifests itself in preferences and beliefs and by extension the usage of 
financial services.    
 
                                                 
5 Besley (1995) and Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff (2002) use firm-level data to show that investment 
increases when institutions do a better job of protecting property rights. 
6 We relax this assumption in the empirical work by including Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs).  
Effectively, the empirical strategy assumes that formal institutional constraints are the same for immigrants 
living in the same MSA. 
7 Undocumented immigrants may not have access to the same legal protections as documented immigrants; 
however, our results are robust to restricting the sample to citizen immigrants for whom this potential 
discrepancy is not an issue.   4
Studying immigrants creates some new empirical challenges.  Immigrants are not random 
representatives of their birth countries.  Instead they have, typically, chosen to come to 
the U.S.  The decision to emigrate may be influenced by country of origin qualities that 
are correlated with unobservable individual characteristics.  We take a number of steps to 
ensure that our findings are robust to this type of unobserved heterogeneity.
8  
 
We find that wealthier and more educated immigrants are more likely to make use of 
basic banking services and have higher measures of financial depth.  Holding these (and 
other) factors constant, we find immigrants from countries with more effective 
institutions are more likely to have a relationship with a bank and also use formal 
financial markets more extensively.  These results are robust to alternative measures of 
institutional effectiveness, adding additional country of origin controls and various 
methods of addressing potential bias due unobserved individual characteristics, including 
specifications with country fixed-effects.  Country of origin institutions affect the 
financial market participation of recent immigrants as well as those with up to 27 years of 
U.S. experience.  They also influence the behavior of immigrants who arrive in the U.S. 
as children as well as those who migrate as adults.  Institutional quality appears to shape 
preferences and beliefs in a way that influences both the breadth and the depth of 
financial access.   
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the framework we use 
to develop the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data.  In section 4 we discuss our 
empirical findings.  Section 5 concludes.    
 
2.  Conceptual Framework 
In this section, we draw on Osili and Paulson (2005) to sketch out a simple reduced-form 
framework to make the hypotheses that we test clear.  Following North (1990), we define 
institutions as “the rules of the game in a society,” including formal institutions that 
protect and  enforce the various property rights as well as informal institutions, which are 
society’s underlying norms of conduct.  Both formal and informal aspects of institutions 
can affect the incentives and costs associated with financial institutions.  
 
We illustrate the framework in terms of an individual’s decision about whether to hold a 
given financial asset –demand deposits, stock, and other financial assets.  For example, 
consider an individual, i, from country J who is considering whether or not to open a 
bank account.  The individual’s demand for a given financial asset is represented by: 
) , ( i i X R f S =  
                                                 
8 Our empirical strategy is similar to that of Fernandez and Fogli (2005) who show that country-of-ancestry 
fertility and female labor force characteristics influence the fertility and work behavior of U.S.-born 
children of immigrants.
 Carroll, Rhee and Rhee (1994) also use a conceptually similar approach in their 
study of the cultural determinants of savings.  Hendricks (2004) examines the behavior of immigrants in the 
U.S. to explain variation in hours worked across countries.  For hours worked in the U.S. he finds that 
home-country characteristics are important for women but not for men.  Borjas (1987) also looks at the 
impact of country-of-origin characteristics on immigrant wage assimilation.   5
where  Si is the amount that individual i invests in a given financial asset, R is the 
expected return from the investment, and Xi is a vector of individual characteristics (risk 
aversion, wealth, income, education, years in the U.S., age at migration, and other 
characteristics) that affect the demand for the financial asset.   
 
Institutional quality is modeled by assuming that the investor believes there is some 
probability, πi that the bank or other financial institution will abscond with the investor’s 
funds.  This variable captures the investor’s beliefs about the likelihood of expropriation 
by firm managers or by the government.  It measures not only the possibility that the 
bank managers or financial institution will abscond with funds but also the possibility 
that the institutional framework is not sufficient to ensure that funds will be invested in 
profit-maximizing projects and that investment proceeds will be appropriately reinvested 
or returned to investors.  We assume that all brokers are governed by the same 
institutional framework and therefore they face a common cost of absconding.  This 
means that broker variation in the likelihood of absconding can be safely ignored. 
 
Given her beliefs, the investor’s expected return on the investment will not be R, the 
expected return on the financial asset, but πi x 0 + (1 – πi) x R.  The probability that an 
investor places on the likelihood that the bank manager absconds is a function of the 
quality of the institutions in the country that investor was born in, J, which may in turn be 
a function of the length of time the investor experienced those institutions, yJ, and the 
length exposure that the investor has to U.S. institutions, yUS: πi = π(J, yJ, yUS).  
 
For the typical immigrant who comes from a country where institutions are weaker than 
in the U.S., π is decreasing in origin-country institutional quality, increasing in years 
spent in the origin country, and decreasing in years spent in the U.S.  Given this 
framework, demand for a given financial asset will be increasing in home-country 
institutional quality, and for a given level of institutional quality, π will be higher for 
individuals who have recently arrived in the U.S. and who have arrived as adults. 
 
A closely related channel through which origin country institutions exert an influence on 
financial market behavior is by influencing the expected costs of participation in financial 
markets.
9  In standard theoretical models of financial behavior, the fixed costs of 
participation may deter an individual from holding a given financial asset.  Guiso at al 
(2003) provide empirical evidence on the importance of participation costs across 
countries.  We can modify the framework described above to take this into account.
10   
 
Specifically, we assume that the investor forms beliefs about the fixed costs of 
participation that vary with institutional quality.  The investor believes that there is some 
probability, αi, that the costs of investing are high, F
H and some probability, (1 - αi), that 
                                                 
9 For example, several authors have studied the effect of market frictions mostly in the form of fixed entry 
and/or transaction costs on stock market participation. 
10 It is straightforward to extend the model to consider the effect of institutions as mediated through the 
ability to transfer ownership or liquidate financial assets.  With weak institutions, the expected costs of 
transferring or liquidating financial assets are likely to be high.   6
the cost of investing will be zero.
11  Given these beliefs, the investor’s expected net return 
on the financial asset is equal to: 
 
[πi x 0 + (1 – πi) x R] – [αi x Fi. + (1 - αi) x 0] 
 
We assume that perceptions regarding the fixed costs of investment, αi, for a given 
financial asset will vary with quality of the institutions in the country that investor was 
born in, J, which may in turn be a function of the length of time the investor experienced 
those institutions, yJ, and the length exposure that the investor has to U.S. institutions, 
yUS: Fi = F(J, yJ, yUS).
12 
 
An additional channel through which origin country institutions may affect immigrant’s 
financial decisions is through supply.  Several empirical studies emphasize the role of 
legal and regulatory institutions in the emergence and development of financial 
markets.
13  The key assumption here is that better institutional quality will lower the costs 
that the financial institutions incur in providing services to individuals and households. 
For example, better institutions would lower the cost of monitoring and screening for 
banks, allowing the expansion of banking institutions.  If better institutions lead to an 
expansion in the supply of origin country financial institutions, then immigrants will have 
had more opportunities for direct exposure to financial institutions prior to migration. 
 
3.  Data 
 
Individual data 
The challenge in using individual data is to find meaningful variation in institutional 
quality within a single data set.  We achieve this by looking at a large sample of 
immigrants living in the U.S.  Historically high rates of migration to the U.S. in the past 
two decades mean that at least 10 percent of the U.S. population was born abroad.  The 
1996 – 2000 Survey on Income and Program Participation (SIPP) data that we use are 
designed to be representative of the U.S. population and include approximately 46,000 
individuals, of whom 11 percent are immigrants.  These individuals face a common set of 
formal institutional constraints in the U.S., but the immigrants vary in the institutional 
constraints that they have experienced prior to coming to the U.S. 
 
The indicators of financial access that we focus on are financial depth (owning a 
checking or a savings account) and financial depth (the number of distinct functions of 
financial markets that an individual makes use of: safe savings, payment services and 
                                                 
11 Assuming the fixed costs would be zero simplifies the analysis a bit.  We would get the same substantive 
results if we assumed that the investor believed there was some probability that fixed costs would be low. 
12 The World Bank database on financial market access suggests that transaction costs associated with 
financial market activity can be quite high. For example, minimum amounts required to open a checking 
account in some African countries like Malawi and Uganda can be as high has over 30 to 50 percent of 
GDP per capita. 
13 For example, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Peria (2006) document large differences in the supply of banks 
and other financial institutions across countries. For example, in many countries in Sub Saharan Africa 
there is less than one bank branch per 100,000 people, while some developed countries (Portugal, Spain) 
have 50 or more bank branches per 100,000 people.   7
investment services).  We find low rates of financial market participation among 
immigrants compared to the native-born.  Sixty-one percent of the immigrant sample has 
a savings or a checking account, compared with 76 percent of the native-born (see Table 
2A).  The median measure of financial depth is one for immigrants and two for the 
native-born.  In addition, we see that 47 percent of immigrants have a checking account 
compared with 64 percent of the native-born.  Savings account ownership has a similar 
pattern.  Forty percent of the immigrant sample has a savings account, compared with 55 
percent of the native-born.   
 
Table 2C and Figure 0 provide further evidence of relatively low rates of financial market 
participation among immigrants compared to the native-born.  Based on a wide range of 
financial indicators, the median immigrant is likely to use the formal financial sector for 
either safe savings or for payment services, while the median native-born individual is 
likely to use both of these functions of financial markets.    
 
We restrict the sample to immigrants who are over 18 and live in a metropolitan 
statistical area (MSA), for a total sample of 15,043 observations, with (approximately) 4 
annual observations per person.
14  Table 2A summarizes these data for immigrants and 
the native-born. Compared to the native-born, immigrants are younger, more likely to be 
married, non-white, have more children and more likely to be unemployed or 
economically inactive.  Immigrants also tend to be less educated than the native-born.  
Slightly less than 36 percent of the immigrant sample has never completed high school 
compared to only 15 percent of the native-born sample.  However, the percentage of 
immigrants and the native-born who have an advanced degree is roughly the same at 7 
percent and 8 percent, respectively.   
 
Monthly per capita household income is significantly lower for immigrants compared to 
the native born.  For immigrants, average monthly per capita household income is 
$1,640, compared to $2,224 for the native-born.  In addition to having lower incomes, 
immigrant households have also accumulated less wealth compared to households headed 
by individuals who were born in the U.S.  The median immigrant household has wealth 
of $29,001 compared to $71,123 for the native-born. 
 
Additional immigrant characteristics are described in Table 2B.  Nearly one-half of the 
immigrants arrived in the U.S. within the 10 prior to the start of the survey. Just under 
half of the immigrants were born in a North American country and about 15 percent were 
born in Europe.
15  Most of the immigrants arrived in the U.S. as adults, with almost 71 
percent arriving at twenty-one years or older.  
                                                 
14 We restrict our attention to the four annual survey waves where wealth data are available.  Other SIPP 
data are collected quarterly.   
15 Mexico accounts for just over one-quarter of the immigrants in the sample.  We assign institutional 
quality measures to individuals who were born in the Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia or 
Czechoslovakia in the following way:  individuals who reported that they were born in Russia, Armenia, 
Azerbijan, the Baltic States, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyztan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, USSR, Uzebekistan are mapped to the institutional quality 
measure for the Soviet Union; individuals who reported that they were born in Czechoslovakia, Slovakia, 
Czech Republic are mapped to the institutional quality measure for Czechoslovakia and individuals who   8
 
Country data 
The individual data are augmented with country-level data compiled from various 
sources.  These data include various measures of institutional quality, and other important 
country characteristics.  Table 1 defines each variable and describes its source.     
 
The measure of institutional quality that we use is “protection from expropriation”.
16  
This variable evaluates the risk “outright confiscation and forced nationalization” of 
property and comes from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) IRIS-3 Data.  
Ratings range from 1 to 10 and lower ratings “are given to countries where expropriation 
of private foreign investment is a likely event.”  We average annual country observations 
from 1982 to 1995 to form the “protection from expropriation” variable that is used in the 
empirical work. 
 
In addition to institutional quality, we also examine how financial market participation is 
influenced by geography (as captured by the absolute value of the latitude of the 
country’s capital divided by 90) and legal origins (in particular whether the country has a 
common law tradition, or not).  Other important country of origin variables include: gdp 
per capita, religious composition, measures of infrastructure including internet usage, an 
indicator for whether immigrants from the country in question are likely to speak English, 
and characteristics of the financial sector in the country of origin.  
 
Table 3A presents summary statistics for each of the country-level variables that we use.  
U.S. values for each variable are reported in the column on the far right of the table. 
Protection from expropriation, ranges from 1.83 (Iraq) to 10.00 (the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, the U.S.).  The average is 7.50.  One attractive feature of the “protection 
from expropriation” measure of institutional quality is that improvements in “protection 
from expropriation” are correlated with future equity returns (Erb, Harvey and Viskanta 
(1996)).
17  Açemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001 and 2002) find that institutional 
quality, as measured by protection from expropriation, causes long-run economic and 
financial development.  Correlations between the various country of origin variables are 
presented in Table 3B.   
 
4.  Empirical Findings 
 
This section reports on our empirical findings.  We estimate financial breadth (Bisj) and 
financial depth (Disj) using the following linear model: 
 
Bisj or Disj = α + β1Xi + β2Zj + δs + εisj, 
                                                                                                                                                 
reported that they were born in Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzogovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Slovenia, Serbia are assigned the institutional quality measure for Yugoslavia. 
16 In previous work (see Osili and Paulson, 2005) we have investigated alternative measures of institutional 
quality.  The findings presented in this paper are also robust to alternative measures of institutional quality, 
including: constraints on the executive and measures of domestic protection from expropriation.  These 
results are available from the authors. 
17Erb, Harvey and Viskanta (1996) find that changes in “rule of law” and other ICRG-IRIS-3 variables are 
not correlated with future equity returns.     9
 
where Bisj is the decision to have a bank account (or the intensity of financial market 
participation, Disj) for individual i who lives in metropolitan statistical area s and comes 
from country j.  Individual controls are incorporated in Xi and include age, age squared, 
wealth quartiles, income, labor force status, education, sex, marital status, number of 
children in household, and race.  A full set of MSA controls are included in δs, and Zj 
measures supply characteristics in country j.  To the extent that individual characteristics, 
like wealth and education, are influenced by supply characteristics in the country of 
origin, the regression will tend to produce overly conservative estimates of the direct 
effect of institutions, β2.   
 
By including measures of individual characteristics, we are able to isolate the effect of 
country of origin institutions.
18  All of the reported standard errors are adjusted to allow 
for correlation across observations for immigrants that come from the same country.   
When the dependent variable is Bisj we also correct for the heteroscedasticity that is 
implicit in a linear probability model.
19      
 
Baseline Findings and Institutions v. Geography and Legal Origins  
The relationship between financial market participation and institutional quality is 
explored in Table 4 for a variety of country of origin characteristics. Columns [1] – [4] 
report the results for financial breadth and columns [5] – [8] report the results for 
financial depth.  Figures 1A and B summarize the relationship between “protection from 
expropriation” and financial market participation implied by regressions [1] and [5]. 
 
The sample is restricted to immigrants who are at least 18 years of age, live in a MSA 
and come from one of the 78 countries for which institutional quality data are available.  
In addition to a measure of institutional quality, human capital or geography, the 
explanatory variables include age, age squared, wealth quartiles, labor force status, 
income, marital status, sex, race, education, number of children and controls for the MSA 
where the immigrant lives.
20    
 
We find that institutional quality has a positive and significant effect on having a bank 
account.  According to these estimates, if an individual from a country with “average” 
institutions, as captured by “protection from expropriation” had instead come from a 
country that had institutions that were one standard deviation above the mean, the 
likelihood that they had a savings or a checking account would increase by 4.7 
                                                 
18 This addresses an important concern with some earlier cross-country studies that focus on the impact of 
institutions on financial development.  For example, the identification strategy used by Açemoglu, Johnson 
and Robinson (2001 and 2002) stresses the link between institutional development and settler mortality 
during the colonial period, but leaves open the possibility that the human capital of colonial settlers played 
a role in future economic development. 
 
19 We use a linear probability model because it is computationally attractive given the large number of 
fixed effects, is consistent under weak assumptions and because the coefficient estimates are easy to 
interpret.  In particular, the coefficients on interaction terms are straight-forward to interpret (see Ai and 
Norton, 2003).  Non-linear estimation methods, such as probit or logit, generate similar results. 
20 See Appendix Table 2 for the impact of these independent variables.   10
percentage points, a 7.7 percent increase in the likelihood of having a bank account, 
relative to the observed likelihood for immigrants of 61 percent.  The same change is 
associated with a 10 percent increase in financial depth.  This is roughly equivalent to 
considering what would happen if Argentina’s “protection from expropriation” had been 
the same as Germany’s between 1982 and 1995.   
 
In cross-country studies, geographic attributes of countries have been found to have a 
significant effect on income per capita and economic growth, see for example Gallup, 
Sachs and Mellinger (1998) or Sachs and Malaney (2002).  Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine (2003b) show that latitude helps to explain financial development.  We use the 
absolute value of the latitude of the capital city divided by 90 to capture this effect and 
find that individuals who were born in countries that are further from the equator are 
significantly more likely to have a bank account and to otherwise participate in the U.S. 
financial markets (see columns [2] and [6]).  A one standard deviation increase in the 
distance from the equator is associated with a 3.7 percentage point increase in the 
likelihood of having a bank account and a 8% increase in financial depth.  
 
La Porta et al. (1998 and 2000) show that greater protection is offered to shareholders in 
countries with a British legal tradition and that financial development is accelerated in 
these countries.  This possibility is explored in columns [3] and [7].  Our findings parallel 
theirs: the probability of having a bank account among immigrants from countries with a 
British legal tradition is 4.4 percentage points higher than that of immigrants from 
countries with a different legal tradition.  Financial depth is estimated to be 11 percent 
higher for immigrants from countries with a British legal tradition. 
 
Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004) and Açemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) 
find that geography has an important effect through its impact on the quality of 
institutions.  They contend that countries that are further from the equator tend to develop 
stronger institutions.  Açemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) argue that European 
colonialists adopted different colonization policies depending on the host country 
environment, leading to more effective institutional arrangements in some countries.   
Although their work emphasizes the role of settler mortality rates in determining the 
colonization policy, they also show that places where effective institutional arrangements 
were established tend to be further from the equator.  In regressions [4] and [8], we allow 
financial market participation to be influenced by institutions, geography and legal origin.   
 
Our findings parallel those of Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004) and Açemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson (2001).  Once institutional quality is controlled for, geography and 
legal origin no longer have a significant impact on financial market participation.
21  
Institutional quality continues to have a strong, significant effect on both financial 
breadth and depth.    
 
                                                 
21 We should note that other aspects of geography may be important.  For example, Sachs (2003) finds that 
malaria transmission, which is related to geography, impacts the level of income per capita after controlling 
for institutional quality.     11
These baseline findings suggest that immigrants come to the U.S. with attitudes shaped 
by the effectiveness of home-country institutions, and that the ability of home-country 
institutions to protect investment and provide incentives for investment has a significant 
effect on immigrant behavior in the U.S. over and above the impact of individual 
characteristics including wealth, income and education.  In addition, institutional quality 
is trumps the importance of geography and legal origins when all three country of origin 
characteristics are included in the regression.  For ease of exposition, the rest of the paper 
uses a single measure of institutional quality, “protection from expropriation”.  We have 




Omitted Country Variables 
We turn our attention now to exploring the robustness of our findings.  The first issue we 
consider is that there may be other important country-of-origin characteristics that are 
correlated with institutional quality that were left out of the baseline results.  We explore 
the impact of adding additional country characteristics in Tables 5A and 5B, for having a 
bank account and for financial depth, respectively.  In addition to the explanatory 
variables reported on in Tables 5A and B, each of these estimates includes all of the same 
control variables that were included in the baseline estimates.
23 
 
For purposes of comparison, the first column of Tables 5A repeats the results from Table 
4 column [1], and the first column of Table 5B repeats the results from Table 4 column 
[5].  In column [2] of Tables 5A and B, we report on estimates that include continent 
controls in addition to protection from expropriation.  The size of the coefficient on 
protection from expropriation declines modestly, but otherwise results are unchanged.  
This rules out the possibility that the results were driven by discrimination against 
individuals based on their continent of origin, say Africa or Central or South America, for 
example, and that countries in the same continent tend to share institutional qualities.
24   
 
We also examine the possibility that religious influences on institutional quality are 
responsible for our earlier findings in column [3] of Tables 5A and B.  Stulz and 
Williamson (2003), for example, document a link between a country’s religious attributes 
and investor rights, particularly creditor rights.  This estimate adds controls for the 
percentage of the country-of-origin population that is Catholic, Protestant and Muslim to 
the baseline specification.  Adding these variables lowers the point estimate of the impact 
of institutional quality from 0.027 to 0.023 in the case of having a bank relationship and 
from 0.071 to 0.057 in the case of financial depth.    
 
                                                 
22 In addition to the results reported here, we find similar results when we use alternative measures of 
institutional quality including: “rule of law”, the “quality of the bureaucracy” (both from the ICRG-IRIS-3 
data set), “domestic protection from expropriation” (see Osili and Paulson (2005) for details on how this 
variable is created), and “constraints on the executive” (from the Polity IV database). 
23 The issue of omitted country characteristics is also addressed in specifications which include country 
fixed effects (see Table 6) and in placebo regressions (see Table 7). 
24 Recall that the estimates include a control for being “non-white”, so the continent controls capture 
differential treatment based on continent of origin, holding racial characteristics fixed.   12
Another potential explanation for our findings is that financial market adaptation may be 
easier for immigrants from countries that are more similar to the U.S.  This would mean 
that the positive coefficient on protection from expropriation should be interpreted to 
mean that individuals from countries with institutions like the U.S. are more likely to 
participate in U.S. financial markets, rather than as an indication that better institutions to 
protect private property encourage financial market participation.  If this is the case, then 
including other, potentially better, measures of the similarity between the country-of-
origin economy and the U.S. should eliminate the significance of “protection from 
expropriation”.   
 
In order to capture this possibility, we include average per capita GDP from 1982 to 1995 
in the country of origin in the estimate presented in column [4] of Tables 5A and B.  
Countries with better institutions have higher GDP per capita (see Rodrik, Subramainan 
and Trebbi (2004), for example), so including this variable may absorb some of the effect 
of institutional quality.  The likelihood of having a bank relationship and the number of 
financial relationships are predicted to be significantly higher when GDP per capita is 
higher.
25  Adding this variable reduces the coefficient on “protection from expropriation” 
from 0.027 to 0.020 for the probability of having a bank account and from 0.071 to 0.044 
in the case of financial depth, however its effect remains highly significant.   
 
Since countries with high institutional quality also tend to have been colonized by 
Britain, it is possible that the positive coefficient on protection from expropriation is 
capturing not institutional quality, but the ability of individuals who were born in some 
former British colonies to speak English.  The ability or inability to speak English may 
play an important role in determining the ease of financial market participation.
26  
Ideally, we would include an individual measure of English speaking ability in the 
estimates.
27  However, the SIPP data do not include any measure of this characteristic, so 
we try to capture it at the country level instead.   
 
Column [5] in Tables 5A and B adds an indicator variable that is equal to one if the 
country of origin has English as an official language of the country and if a majority of 
immigrants from that country surveyed in the 1980 U.S. Census spoke English at home 
(see Bleakley and Chin, 2004). Coming from a country where English is spoken does not 
have a significant impact on the likelihood of owning a bank account or on the number of 
financial relationships.  Adding this variable to the estimates lowers the point estimate of 
the coefficient on institutional quality somewhat for both dependent variables.  However, 
it remains positive and significant.   
 
                                                 
25 Many studies, including Hall and Jones (1999), Açemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002), 
Açemoglu and Johnson (2005), Easterly and Levine (2003), and Rodrik, Subramainian and Trebbi (2004) 
find that GDP per capita is higher in countries with better institutions.  
26 Chiswick (1978) and Borjas (1987) show that immigrants from English speaking countries experience 
more rapid wage assimilation.   
27 We should note that our estimates do include household income and education, which are likely to 
partially account for the ability to speak English.  Black, Haviland, Sanders and Taylor (2006) find that 
college-educated immigrants who speak English at home have wages that are the same as similar native-
born individuals.     13
The availability of home-country financial markets may also influence the likelihood of 
financial market participation among immigrants in the U.S.  The supply of banks may be 
lower in countries where entry is costly.  In column [6] of Table 5A and B, we add “bank 
freedom” to the regression.
28  This variable measures the absence of government 
interference in the banking sector and is likely to be higher in countries where entry is 
less costly (see Table 1 for a detailed definition).  The freedom of the country of origin 
banking sector has a positive and significant effect on financial market participation.   
However, home country institutions remain important. The coefficient on institutional 
quality in the regression where having a bank account is the dependent variable is highly 
significant and equal to 0.029.  Note that the freedom of the banking sector is likely to be 
influenced, perhaps quite strongly, by the quality of country-of-origin institutions.  We 
have replicated these results using a measure of banking concentration (the percentage of 
banking assets held by the three largest banks) with similar results.
29     
 
In column [7] of Tables 5A and B, we add a proxy for infrastructure conditions in the 
country of origin.  The measure we use is the number of internet users per 1,000 people.  
The specific measure does not seem to be important, and we get similar results when we 
use telephone usage or the percentage of roads that are paved.  In countries where 
infrastructure is weak, individuals may have little direct experience with banks and other 
financial institutions since they may be costly to get to and to communicate with.  These 
conditions appear to spill over to behavior in the U.S.  Immigrants from countries with 
more extensive infrastructure are more likely to participate in U.S. financial markets, 
whether we use financial breadth or financial depth as the dependent variable.  The 
coefficient on institutional quality remains positive and strongly significant in these 
regressions. 
 
Overall the results presented in Tables 5A and 5B suggest that the finding that financial 
market participation in the U.S. is influenced by the quality of institutions in the country 
of origin is robust to including additional attributes of the country of origin.  
 
Unobserved Heterogeneity 
We turn our attention now to what is an important empirical issue for any study of 
immigrant behavior and for ours in particular.  Immigrants are not random 
representatives of their country of origin.  They choose to migrate and that decision may 
be influenced by characteristics that are not observable.  If unobserved individual 
characteristics are correlated with country-of-origin institutional quality, then we need to 
be concerned that our findings capture the effect of unobserved individual characteristics, 
rather than the effect of institutional quality.   
 
                                                 
28 Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2004) find that firms’ access to finance is more restricted by 
concentration in the banking industry in countries where bank freedom is lower. 
29 We have also examined the effect of controlling for remittances to the home country.  If immigrants are 
not investing in U.S. financial markets perhaps they are investing at home through remittances.  Including a 
measure of remittances received in the home country does not alter the effect of institutional quality.  We 
find that migrants from countries that receive higher per capita remittances are more likely to participate in 
U.S. financial markets.  This is consistent with work by Aggarwal, Demirgüç-Kunt and Peria (2005) who 
find that remittances promote financial development.   14
Borjas (1987) describes one avenue through which unobserved heterogeneity could bias 
the results.  In his model, the decision to migrate will be a function of, among other 
things, unobserved migrant ability and the distribution of income in the country of origin 
and the destination country.  Because high ability migrants are only concerned with the 
right tail of the income distribution, they will tend to migrate from more equal societies to 
less equal ones.   In contrast, low ability migrants will move from less equal societies to 
more equal ones, to protect themselves against a draw from the low end of the wage 
distribution. Assuming that unobserved ability affects financial behavior as well as labor 
market outcomes, this type of selection could bias our results.   
 
Since countries with low inequality also tend to have strong institutions, our finding that 
financial market participation increases with country-of-origin institutional quality could 
be driven by ability bias.
30  For example, immigrants from Sweden, a country with low 
inequality (relative to the U.S.) and high quality institutions, are likely to be of high 
ability.  In contrast, immigrants from Brazil, a country with high inequality and less 
effective institutions will tend to have lower unobserved ability.   
 
In addition to unobserved ability, there are other individual characteristics that we cannot 
observe that may play a role in the decision to participate in financial markets and may 
also be correlated with country-of-origin institutional quality.  For example, the degree of 
risk aversion may be correlated with the likelihood of migration from particular countries 
and also influence the decision to own stock.  Similarly, variation in the quality of 
schooling across countries may impact the cost of obtaining information about U.S. 
financial markets.
31   
 
In order to produce unbiased estimates of the effect of country-of-origin institutional 
quality on financial market participation in the U.S., we need to eliminate the possibility 
that omitted individual characteristics are correlated with country-of-origin institutional 
quality.  If we can do this, we can confidently interpret the coefficient estimate on 
institutional quality, despite the fact that there may be important individual characteristics 
that we do not observe.   
 
To do this, we create a new measure of institutional quality that captures both 
institutional quality and the potential size of an immigrant network.  The new measure of 
institutional quality is the interaction of “protection from expropriation” with “ethnic 
concentration.  Ethnic concentration is defined as the percentage of people in an MSA 




ECsj   MSA in    population   total
MSA  in    living   country    from   immigrants   of   #
=  
                                                 
30 Engermann and Sokoloff  (2002) provide evidence that in societies with high initial inequality the 
evolution of institutions favored a narrow elite. 
31 In addition, parental participation in financial markets is likely to be correlated with country-of-origin 
institutional quality and with the decision of the current generation to participate in financial markets 
(Chiteji and Stafford (2000)).   15
 
Because this new institutional quality measure varies by country of origin, we can include 
country-of-origin fixed effects in the estimation.  By including country-of-origin fixed 
effects, we eliminate correlation between unobserved individual attributes and country of 
origin.  Appendix Table 1 reports the median ethnic concentration for immigrants from 
each country.  We use data from the 1990 Census IPUMS to calculate this measure for 
each country of origin and MSA.   
 
In Table 6, we estimate: 
 
Bisj  or Fisj = α + β1Xi + β2ZjxECsj + β3ECsj  + δs + δj + εisj, 
 
where ZjxECsj is the interaction of institutional quality and ethnic concentration for an 
individual from country j who lives in MSA s.  We include a full set of country-of-origin 
controls in δj.  All of the other variables are defined above. 
 
By including MSA fixed effects in all of the estimates, we rule out another potential 
source of bias in the new institutional quality measure.
32  Since location choice is non-
random, immigrants who choose to live in an MSA with a large fraction of immigrants 
from the same country of origin are likely to be systematically different along 
unobservable dimensions from immigrants who choose to live in an MSA with very few 
immigrants from the same country of origin.   By including MSA fixed effects, we ensure 
that the coefficient on protection from expropriation interacted with ethnic concentration 
will not be biased by these unobservable characteristics. 
 
In addition to dealing with a potential source of bias, this approach may also shed light on 
why the quality of country-of-origin institutions matters for financial market 
participation.  A significant and positive coefficient on the new institutional quality 
measure means that the impact of coming from a country with weak institutions is 
reinforced when individuals from countries with weak institutions live near one another.  
 
These estimates are reported in Table 6 The first two columns report the results for the 
probability of having a bank account and the last two report the results for the number of 
financial relationships.  The estimates presented in columns [1] and [3] do not include 
country fixed effects.  Columns [2] and [4] add country fixed effects.  These estimates are 
summarized in Figures 2A and B.  The coefficient on institutional quality interacted with 
ethnic concentration remains positive and significant when country fixed effects are 
included.   
 
For the median immigrant who lives in a metropolitan area where 0.78 percent of the 
population comes from the same country, the estimates imply that the likelihood of 
having a bank account would increase by 1.1 percentage points and that an individual 
would make use of 0.03 more of the functions of financial markets if institutional quality 
were one standard deviation higher from 1982 to 1995.  By comparison, the baseline 
                                                 
32 Note that ECsj varies by country-of-origin for a given MSA, so we can include both country and MSA 
fixed effects in the regressions.   16
findings, which are not corrected for unobserved heterogeneity, imply that the same 
increase in institutional quality is associated with a 4.7 percentage point increase in the 
likelihood of having a bank account and a 0.12 increase in financial depth.   
 
Enforcement of Informal Institutional Constraints 
In addition to addressing an important econometric issue, the estimates which include 
institutional quality interacted with ethnic concentration speak to an important 
substantive one.  North (1993) defines institutions as a trinity: the formal rules of the 
game, informal institutional constraints and the enforcement of formal and informal 
constraints.  One role of neighborhoods with a large population of immigrants from a 
single country is the enforcement of country-of-origin norms and customs (see for 
example Kandori (1992)).  When immigrants live in a place where country-of-origin 
institutional constraints are more likely to be enforced, these constraints should matter 
more.   
 
We find evidence in favor of this view.  Ethnic concentration is roughly twice that of the 
median immigrant for Filipino immigrants and about one-half of the median for 
Portuguese immigrants.  A one standard deviation improvement in institutions in the 
Philippines is predicted to increase the probability that Filipinos have a bank account by   
2.6 percentage points and financial depth by 0.08.  The same improvement in institutional 
quality would increase bank account ownership by 0.52 percentage points and financial 
depth by 0.02 for Portuguese immigrants. 
 
The finding that the effect of institutional quality varies with size of the potential 
immigrant network is consistent with work by Madrian and Shea (2000), Duflo and Saez 
(2003) and Hong, Kubik and Stein (2004) who show that social interactions have 
important effects on financial decisions.   Immigrant networks have also been show to be 
important in a number of other non-financial contexts, including employment 
probabilities (Munshi, 2003), wage growth and human capital accumulation (Boras, 1995 
and 2000) and language proficiency (Chiswick and Miller, 1996).
33 
 
The effect of institutional quality on other behavior 
In Table 7 we present estimates of the effect of country-of-origin institutional quality on 
the decision to own stock, to have a savings account, to have a checking account, to be 
self-employed, to drive one’s own car to work, and to visit a doctor.  These estimates 
serve two purposes.  First, they allow us to test the hypothesis that the importance of 
institutional quality declines with the level of institutional support required to make a 
particular investment decision reasonable.  Second, these estimates address the possibility 
that institutional quality is proxying for some other country-of-origin characteristic – 
national attitudes regarding self-reliance or altruism, for example -- that explains all sorts 
of behavior, not just behavior that should be governed by the institutions that determine 
protection of private property and incentives for investment.  In other words, the 
                                                 
33 In addition, Fernandez and Fogli (2005) show that the impact of country-of-ancestry norms on fertility 
and women’s labor force participation is also amplified for the children of immigrants who reside in 
neighborhoods with other people who share the same country of ancestry.      17
regressions in Table 7 tell us if institutional quality matters when it is supposed to and 
does not matter when it should not. 
 
The first panel of Table 7 uses the baseline specification and the second panel controls 
for unobserved heterogeneity using the specification from Table 6, which interacts 
protection from expropriation with ethnic concentration and includes country-of-origin 
fixed effects.   
 
Looking first at the decision to open a savings account (column [2]), we see that in the 
baseline specification higher institutional quality is associated with a higher likelihood of 
having a savings account.  A one standard deviation increase in institutional quality is 
associated with a 3.8 percentage point increase in the likelihood of having a savings 
account, a 9.5 percent increase in the likelihood of having a savings account relative to 
the observed percentage of immigrants with a savings account of 40.1 percent.  The same 
increase in institutional quality is predicted to increase stock market participation by 29 
percent (column [1]).  As we expect from the relative importance of institutional support 
required by the two investments, institutional quality has a larger impact on the likelihood 
of owning equity compared to the likelihood of having a savings account.  In addition, we 
cannot rule out the possibility that the savings account results are due to biases induced 
by unobserved heterogeneity.   
 
Owning a checking account and using checks are more institutionally intense compared 
to having a savings account.  Not only must an individual be convinced that the bank will 
keep funds safe and available upon demand, but they must also be convinced that the 
payment system as a whole and the system for getting checks from one place to another is 
sufficiently secure to prevent fraud.  At the same time, the threshold of institutional 
quality that is required to support checks is lower than that required to support 
investments in the stock market.  The results bear out this ranking (see column [3]).  In 
contrast to the findings for savings accounts, the impact of institutional quality on having 
a checking account is robust to controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, but 
improvements in institutional quality are more important for stocks than for checks.  A 
one standard deviation increase in institutional quality is associated with an 11 percent 
increase in stock market participation and a 4.7 percent increase in the likelihood of 
having a checking account.  Similarly, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004) find that 
households in high social capital areas are more likely to use checks and invest more in 
the stock market. 
 
In column [4], we examine the impact of country of origin institutions on self-
employment.  While higher quality institutions are associated with a higher likelihood of 
self-employment, this finding is not replicated in the specifications that include country 
of origin fixed effects.  This result is somewhat surprising.  Entrepreneurial activities that 
require outside financing would seem to be very institutionally intense.  However, it 
appears that many of the self-employment activities undertaken by immigrants in the 
SIPP do not rely on outside financing.  Instead, they employ the entrepreneur and 
possibly a family member or two and very few make use of debt financing.  These types   18
of investments appear to be primarily intermediated through the family rather than 
through formal financial institutions and the regression results are consistent with this. 
 
We see a similar pattern with a selection of other investment activities that are 
intermediated through the family: driving to work and visiting a doctor (columns [5] and 
[6]).  Investments in these activities are not significantly influenced by country-of-origin 
institutional quality in the baseline specification.  In addition, these results are not robust 
to controlling for unobserved heterogeneity.   
 
The fact that institutional quality has impacts financial decisions that require more   
institutional support and does not appear to influence investments that are mediated 
through the family raises our confidence that our findings are driven by individuals who 
embody home-country institutions and not by some spurious correlation between 
country-of-origin characteristics and immigrant behavior more generally.    
 
The effect of institutional quality on different types of people 
We turn now to analyzing how institutional quality affects different groups of 
immigrants.  These estimates help to identify the potential channels through which home-
country institutions come to influence behavior and also serve as further robustness 
checks on our main results.   
 
Education, occupation, citizenship 
In Table 8, we examine how the impact of institutions varies with education and with 
occupational characteristics.  In the top panel the dependent variable is equal to one if an 
individual has a savings or a checking account.  The dependent variable in the bottom 
panel is financial depth.  In columns [2] and [3], we provide estimates for two education 
groups: high education (those with a college degree or more schooling) and low 
education (those who have not completed high school).  Country of origin institutions are 
important for both groups, with slightly different patterns depending on whether we are 
looking at the probability of having a bank relationship or depth of financial access.   
 
Country of origin institutions appear to be more important among immigrants with less 
schooling.  A one standard deviation increase in home-country institutional quality is 
predicted to raise the likelihood of having a bank account by 7.7 percentage points for 
immigrants in the low education group and by 3.8 percentage points for immigrants in the 
high education group.  A similar, but less pronounced, pattern is seen for financial depth.  
This is consistent with Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004 and 2006) who find that the 
effect of social capital and culture is muted for those with greater education.   
 
In columns [4] and [5], we compare the effect of institutional quality on high and low 
skill workers, respectively.
34  One reason for making this comparison is because foreign 
                                                 
34 “High Skill Workers” are workers whose 3-digit occupation code from SIPP is mapped into the 
“Professional and Technical” or “Executive, Administrative, and Managerial” categories according to 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) classifications.  “Low Skill Workers” include workers whose 3-digit 
occupation code from SIPP is similarly mapped into “Transportation and Material Moving Occupations”,   19
educational credentials are often not accepted by U.S. employers.  This means that a 
highly educated immigrant may be working in a low skill occupation.  It may be the 
occupational milieu rather than education itself that drives the differential impact of 
institutions for high and low education immigrants.  This is consistent with the patterns 
that we see for the likelihood of having a bank account. Among high skill workers, 
country of origin institutions do not have a significant impact on the probability of having 
a bank account.  The effect is large and significant for low skill workers.  Financial depth 
increases significantly with institutional quality for both skill groups, with a slightly 
larger effect for low skill workers.  Recall that all of the regressions include controls for 
education.  
 
In column [6], the sample is restricted to immigrants who are naturalized U.S. citizens.  
Among U.S. citizen immigrants, the likelihood of having a bank account and financial 
depth are significantly increasing in home-country institutional effectiveness. Restricting 
the sample in this way has (at least) two effects.  First, we make sure that the link 
between financial market participation and home-country institutional quality is not 
driven by the reluctance of undocumented immigrants to buy stock and the potential 
correlation between being undocumented and coming from a country with weak 
institutions.  Second, immigrants must choose to become citizens and by doing so signal 
their general orientation toward U.S. society and institutions.  However, despite this 
decision, their investment behavior continues to be influenced by country-of-origin 
institutions, suggesting that informal institutional constraints cannot be shed at will.   
 
Finally in column [7], we eliminate Mexican immigrants from the sample.  Just over a 
quarter of the immigrants were born in Mexico, and we want to make sure that the results 
are not driven by the large number of immigrants who share the same institutional 
background.  Eliminating Mexican immigrants from the sample has no effect on the 
results.   
 
Persistence of Institutions 
We now consider the persistence of the effects of home-country institutions.  We address 
this question in columns 2 - 6 of Table 9 which examines the effect of country-of-origin 
institutional quality on financial market participation in the U.S. for subsets of 
immigrants based on the number of years they have lived in the U.S.  The top panel 
reports results for the likelihood of having a bank account and the bottom panel reports 
on regressions where the dependent variable is financial depth. 
 
Columns 2 – 6 of Table 9 divide the immigrant sample into five sub-samples based on 
how many years they have been living in the U.S.  For each sub-sample, two estimates 
are produced: one which includes controls for how old the immigrant was when she 
arrived in the U.S. and one which does not.  Controlling for age at arrival in the U.S. 
produces slightly more conservative results, so we discuss those estimates in the text.  
The effects of informal institutional constraints are very persistent.  The effect of 
                                                                                                                                                 
“Handlers, Equipment Cleaners, Helpers and Laborers”, or “Service Occupations, Except Private 
Household” categories according to the same BLS classifications.   20
protection from expropriation is positive and significant for every sub-sample, except for 
the sub-sample of immigrants who have been in the U.S. for more than 28 years.   
 
The persistent impact of country of origin institutions suggests that the “supply” channel 
is not the major mechanism by which individuals behavior is influenced by institutions.  
If lack of experience with institutions due to restricted supply conditions in the country of 
origin was the primary mechanism through which institutions influence individual 
behavior, it would be likely to decay with time spent in the U.S.  The long lasting effect 
of country-of-origin institutions is akin to the finding that individuals who lived through 
the Great Depression have persistently higher savings rates (see Meredith and Schewe, 
1994).  
 
Learning about Institutions 
We have presented evidence that informal institutional constraints are embodied in 
individuals and that these constraints influence financial market decisions even in a new 
formal institutional framework.  However, these findings do not address the question of 
how or when these constraints become embodied in individuals.  For example, are they 
inherited and present even in individuals who migrated at a very young age?  Or are they 
only observed individuals who migrate as mature adults, consistent with the view that 
they are shaped by an individual’s experience in their country of origin?  Answers to 
these questions can help us to better understand the channels through which informal 
institutional constraints impact behavior.   
 
We take an initial step toward answering these questions via the estimates presented in 
Table 10.  This table examines the effect of country-of-origin institutional quality on the 
likelihood of having a bank account (top panel) and financial depth (bottom panel) for 
subsets of immigrants based on their age of arrival in the U.S. 
 
Table 10 divides the immigrant sample into three sub-samples based on age at arrival in 
the U.S.: those who arrived before age 16, those who arrived when they were between 16 
and 20 years and those who arrived when they were 21 years or older.  Two estimates are 
produced: one which includes controls for the calendar year when the immigrant arrived 
in the U.S. and one which does not.  Controlling for year of arrival in the U.S. generally 
produces slightly smaller coefficients on institutional quality, so we only discuss the 
findings which include these controls.   
 
Informal institutional constraints from the country of origin are present even in very 
young migrants.  The effect of protection from expropriation is positive and statistically 
significant for all groups, including the youngest migrants.  The point estimate for the 
likelihood of having a bank relationship ranges from 0.032, for immigrants who arrived 
in the U.S. before the age of 16, to 0.019 for immigrants who arrived after their 21
st 
birthday.  For financial depth, the estimates are somewhat smaller for the youngest 
migrants, 0.054, versus 0.061 for the other groups.  Note that differences in the size of the 
coefficient across age groups are not significant. 
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The effect of country-of-origin institutions is present even in those who migrated when 
they were less than 16 and before many of them would have been likely to have had 
much direct experience with their country-of-origin institutions outside of school.  They 
would have been unlikely, for example, to have owned stock or had a bank account or to 
have had direct experience with their country of birth’s legal system.  This suggests that 
families and possibly the educational system, and not just direct experience, play an 
important role in shaping an individual’s perception of the trustworthiness of institutions.   
 
Intergenerational Transmission of Informal Institutional Constraints 
In a final set of estimates, we take another approach to examine the robustness of the 
findings.  This approach also helps to illuminate the mechanism through which 
institutions come to influence behavior.  Expanding on the findings from Table 10, which 
show that the behavior of immigrants who arrived in the U.S. as young children is 
influenced by home-country institutions, we consider whether institutional attitudes are 
inherited.  To do this we take advantage of the fact that the SIPP data provide information 
on region or country of ancestry for individuals born in the U.S.  We can map some of 
these responses to individual countries and then estimate the effect of institutional quality 
on having a bank account and financial depth for natives as well as for immigrants.
35  The 
estimates are presented in Table 11.  The top panel reports results for the probability of 
having a checking or a savings account, and the bottom panel reports results for financial 
depth.   
 
For immigrants, we find a positive and significant effect of institutional quality on 
financial market participation.  For those who were born in the U.S., but trace their 
ancestry to one of the same countries, institutional quality has no effect on financial 
market participation.  When the formal institutional environment is altered as profoundly 
as it is when an individual migrates from one country to another, the influence of 
informal institutional constraints for financial market behavior do not appear to be passed 
along to future generations.  The SIPP data do not include information on the generation 
of ancestry, so we are not able to refine these estimates by comparing the children of 
immigrants and the grand-children of immigrants, for example. 
 
Assessing the importance of institutions 
One way to assess the importance of institutions is to see how much of the variation in 
financial market participation for immigrants from different countries can be explained 
by variation in institutional quality across countries.  To do this, we regress bank account 
ownership and financial depth on a full set of the control variables (age, age squared, 
wealth quartiles, income, labor force status, education, sex, marital status, number of 
children in household, race, MSA controls) as well as controls for country of origin.  The 
coefficients on the country of origin controls represent the “country” components of 
financial market participation holding the control variables listed above fixed.   
 
                                                 
35 We form samples of natives and of immigrants who map their ancestry to or were born in one of the 
following thirteen countries: Canada, France, the Netherlands, England, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Poland, Russia, Cuba, Mexico and the Dominican Republic.   22
These country components are then regressed on protection from expropriation.  The R-
squared in that regression represents the percentage of the country level variation in 
financial market participation that is explained by institutional quality.  For bank account 
ownership, the R-squared is 17 percent and for financial depth it is 27 percent.  This 
exercise suggests that institutions play an important role in explaining cross-country 
variation in financial market participation.    
 
5.  Conclusions 
We find that immigrants from countries with institutions that more effectively protect 
private property and provide incentives for investment are more likely to have a bank 
account in the U.S. and participate more extensively in U.S. financial markets.  The effect 
of home-country institutions effects immigrants for at least the first 28 years that they live 
in the U.S. and is present in even immigrants who arrive in the U.S. as young children.    
The impact of institutions is amplified by living in a neighborhood with many other 
immigrants from the same country of origin.   These findings are robust to alternative 
measures of institutional effectiveness and to various methods of controlling for 
unobserved individual characteristics, including specifications with country fixed-effects.   
 
The results hint at the channel through which the institutional environment comes to 
influence subsequent behavior.  The fact that the impact of institutions is very persistent 
and is present even in the youngest migrants, suggests that the main channel is not lack of 
experience with banks and other institutions because a weak institutional environment 
restricted supply and therefore the opportunity to gain experience with banks and other 
financial entities.  Instead, the findings seem most consistent with the idea that the 
institutional environment becomes part of the cultural capital that individuals bring with 
them wherever they move to.  These preferences and beliefs appear to be quite resistant 
to updating.  Our findings are consistent with recent survey evidence that finds that 
households often choose not to have bank accounts because they dislike dealing with 
banks.  According to a recent analysis of Survey of Consumer Finances data, “often they 
are imbued with a cultural distrust of banks, and they may be concerned with privacy.” 
 
What do our findings tell us about the likely results of efforts to increase financial access 
in developing countries?  First we learn that institutional reform is a very important tool 
in the effort to expand financial access.  In addition, institutional reform is likely to 
increase financial access both directly (through the expansion of banks) and indirectly 
(through beliefs and perceptions about the trustworthiness of financial institutions).  In 
addition, institutions matter even after controlling for wealth, income, and education.  
This suggests that limited usage of financial services is not simply a problem of poverty 
(see Claessens, 2005) and while poverty reduction is likely to increase financial market 
participation, institutional reform has an important role to play as well. 
 
However, mistrust of banks is deeply rooted in informal institutional constraints and is 
resistant to change.  We can think about the immigrant experience in the U.S. as an 
experiment in institutional reform.  In some sense this experiment corresponds to a best 
case scenario for institutional reform: the change in the institutional environment is 
credible, it is multi-faceted, affecting fiscal, monetary and trade policy as well as the   23
judicial and political system; and the majority of the individuals whose behavior we study 
have, in some sense, sought out institutional change and are motivated to succeed 
economically.  Even in this environment, informal institutional constraints influence the 
behavior of international migrants in the U.S. for decades.     24
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Table 1: Definitions and Sources of Country-level Variables 
Variable Definition  and  Source 
Protection from Expropriation 
of Private Investment 
 
This variable evaluates the risk "outright confiscation and forced 
nationalization" of property.  Lower ratings "are given to countries 
where expropriation of private foreign investment is a likely event."  
Variable is the average over annual country observations 1982 – 1995. 
Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) IRIS-3 Data 
British Legal Origin   This variable is equal to one if the legal regime of the country is British 
and zero otherwise.  Source: “The Quality of Government” LaPorta, 
Lopez-de-Silanez, Schleifer, Vishny (1999). 
http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/fl69/datasets.asp 
English Speaking  This variable is equal to one if English is one of the official languages of 
the country and if at least 50% of the immigrants from the country who 
were surveyed in the 1980 U.S. Census report that they do not speak a 
language other than English at home.  
Source: Bleakley, Hoyt and Aimee Chin. “Language Skills and 
Earnings: Evidence from Childhood Immigrants”, Review of Economics 
and Statistics, May 2004. 
Latitude  This variable is equal to the absolute value of the latitude of the 
country’s capital divided by 90.   
Source: “The Quality of Government” LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanez, 
Schleifer, Vishny (1999). 
http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/fl69/datasets.asp 
Av. Per Capita GDP  Average real GDP per capita 1982 – 1995, 1995 dollars.   
Source:  World Bank World Development Indicators. 
Catholic, Protestant, Muslim  The percentage of people in the country (x 100) who are a particular 
religion.   
Source:  CIA Factbook. 
Banking Freedom  This variable indicates the absence of government interference in the 
banking system and is averaged over the period 1995-99.  This indicator 
is based on 5 questions: Specifically, this indicator is based on five 
questions:   (1) Does the government own banks? (2) Can foreign banks 
open branches and subsidiaries? (3) Does the government influence 
credit allocation?  (4) Are banks free to operate without government 
regulations such as deposit insurance? (5) Are banks free to offer all 
types of financial services like buying and selling real estate, securities, 
and insurance policies? 
Source:  Thorston Beck,  Asli Demirguc –Kunt, and Vojislav 
Maksimovic,  “Bank Competition and Access to Finance: 
International Evidence”, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Vol. 
36, No. 3 (June 2004, Part 2) (citing to data indicator from the Heritage 
Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/) 
Bank Concentration  This variable indicates the share of the assets of the largest three banks 
in total banking sector assets, averaged over 1995-1999. The variable is 
calculated using commercial, savings, and cooperative banks as well as 
nonbank credit institutions data from the Bankscope database.  
Source:  Thorston Beck,  Asli Demirguc –Kunt, and Vojislav 
Maksimovic,  “Bank Competition and Access to Finance: 
International Evidence”, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Vol. 
36, No. 3 (June 2004, Part 2)  
Internet Usage  Average number of Internet users per 1,000 people, 1982-1995.  
“Internet users” is defined as people with access to the worldwide 
network.   
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators.   33
Table 2A: Characteristics of Immigrants and the Native Born in the SIPP Data 
 
Characteristic Native  Born  Immigrant 
Individual Characteristics    
Age 46.47  45.22 
 (17.52)  (16.51) 
% Male  45.6%  46.2% 
% Married  57.4%  65.6% 
% non-white  16.4%  32.2% 
% unemployed or out of the labor force  33.8%  36.7% 
# of children < 18 in household  0.720  1.118 
 (1.090)  (1.347) 
Average monthly per capita household income  $2,224.44  $1,639.53 
 (2,832.45)  (2,375.44) 
Median monthly per capita household  income  $1,578 $1,050 
Average household wealth  $185,754  $122,685 
 (1,398,146)  (978,910) 
25
th percentile of household wealth  $14,660  $3,017 
Median household wealth  $71,123  $29,001 
75
th percentile of household wealth  $186,512  $117,917 
Educational Attainment (%)    
Less than High School  15.0%  35.8% 
High School Graduate  30.4%  24.5% 
Some College  30.6%  20.1% 
Bachelor Degree 15.9%  12.5% 
Advanced Degree  8.1%  7.1% 
Financial Market Participation     
Financial Breadth (% with bank relationship)  76.3%  61.0% 
Financial Depth (# of  types of financial relationships) mean  1.71  1.22 
 (1.02)  (1.01) 
Financial Depth - median  2.00  1.00 
% who own stock  20.0%  8.6% 
% with a checking account (interest or non-interest)  63.8%  47.0% 
% with a savings account  54.8%  40.1% 
Other characteristics (%)    
% who are self-employed  9.1%  8.7% 
% who drive own car to work  81.7%  75.1% 
% who visited doctor in past 12 months  78.8%  79.3% 
% who purchased prescription drugs for children  51.8%  34.1% 
Number of Individuals  31,046  5,020 
Number of Observations  100,839  15,043 
Notes: Unless otherwise noted, mean values are reported.  Standard deviations are in parentheses.  The unit 
of observation is a person-wave.  Sample is restricted to the four waves of the Survey on Income and 
Program Participation with wealth information, to individuals 18 and over, to those who live in a 
Metropolitan Statistical Area and to those who have non-missing data for “expropriation risk”.  See text for 
definitions of financial breadth and depth. 
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Table 2B: Immigrant Characteristics  
 
Characteristic Immigrant 
Year of Arrival in the U.S. (%)    
Before 1964  11.5% 
1965 – 1969  8.2% 
1970 – 1974  10.1% 
1975 – 1979  12.8% 
1980 – 1984  17.9% 
1985 – 1989  18.4% 
1990 – 1996  21.2% 
Age at Migration (%)   
five years or younger  3.7% 
six to ten years   4.6% 
eleven to fifteen years  6.8% 
sixteen to twenty years  14.3% 
over twenty years  70.6% 
Continent of Origin (%)   
North America  46.9% 
Europe  15.4% 
Asia  30.3% 
Africa  0.9% 
South America  6.3% 
Australia and Oceania  0.2% 
Notes: Unless otherwise noted, mean values are reported.  Standard deviations are in parentheses.  The unit 
of observation is a person-wave.  Sample is restricted to the four waves of the Survey on Income and 
Program Participation with wealth information, to individuals 18 and over, to those who live in a 
Metropolitan Statistical Area and to those who have non-missing data for “expropriation risk”.   
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  # of Financial Relationships 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
%  of  Total 22.4% 23.4% 26.4% 15.1%  7.8%  3.9%  1.1% 0.1% 
Savings    37.3% 84.2% 84.6% 83.8% 91.8% 98.7%  100% 
Checking    58.6% 88.9% 92.6% 94.9% 97.6% 99.6%  100% 
Stock    2.4%  10.9% 47.1% 65.6% 84.6% 98.6%  100% 
IRA    1.3%  8.1%  36.5% 63.1% 80.7% 99.1%  100% 
CD    1.1%  5.7%  24.3% 40.9% 59.4% 92.9%  100% 
Moneymarket    0.1%  4.6%  19.7% 48.9% 80.6% 97.9%  100% 
Keogh    0.0% 0.2% 0.7% 2.9% 5.2%  13.0%  100% 
 
Immigrants 
  # of Financial Relationships 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
% of Total  38.2%  28.7%  19.3%  7.9%  3.7%  1.5%  0.7%  0.02% 
Savings    37.9% 84.3% 84.8% 83.6% 91.6% 98.6%  100% 
Checking    58.3% 89.1% 92.5% 94.8% 97.7% 99.7%  100% 
Stock    2.2%  10.4% 46.3% 65.3% 84.5% 98.7%  100% 
IRA    1.2%  7.9%  36.3% 63.2% 81.0% 98.9%  100% 
CD    1.1%  5.9%  24.7% 40.9% 59.3% 93.2%  100% 
Moneymarket    1.0%  4.8%  19.9% 49.2% 80.8% 98.1%  100% 
Keogh    0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 3.0% 5.2%  12.8%  100% 
   36
Table 3A: Summary of Country Variables 
Characteristic N  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Min Median  Max  U.S. 
value 
Measures of Institutional Quality 
Protection  from  Expropriation  79  7.50  1.74 1.81  7.51 10.00 10.00 
British  Legal  Origin    79  0.29  0.46  0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Latitude  79  0.33  0.19  0.01 0.33 0.71 0.42 
Other Country Characteristics 
English  Speaking  79  0.139  0.35  0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
GDP Per Capita   74  8,704  10,376  106  3,208  42,873  24,831 
Catholic  74  39.29  40.01 0.00  27.2 97.00 24.00 
Protestant  74  10.43  19.39 0.00  0.35 87.00 52.00 
Muslim  74  16.82  33.77  0.00 0.00  100.00 1.00 
Internet  Usage  77  4.46  8.40 0.00  .43 41.77 33.96 
Banking  Freedom  48  3.34  0.73  1.60 3.30 5.00 4.00 
Bank  Concentration  48  0.52  0.18  0.18 0.51 0.97 0.18  
Table 3B: Correlation between Country Variables 








Protection  from  Expropriation  ----       
British Legal Origin    0.119  ----         
Latitude    0.572***  -0.200*  ----     
Internet Usage   0.607***  0.114   0.530***  ----     
Banking Freedom   0.334**  0.046   0.283**   0.312**  ----   
Bank Concentration  -0.296**  0.006  -0.069  -0.173  -0.335**  ---- 
Notes: *** indicates significance at at least the 1% level, ** at at least the 5% level, * at at least the 10% level.  
Table 4: The Effect of Institutional Quality on Financial Market Participation 
    
  Probability of Having a Bank Relationship  Depth of Financial Market Participation 









   0.056*** 
(0.016) 


















          
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.2666 0.2644 0.2625 0.2668 0.3969 0.3932 0.3906 0.3976 
Number of Observations  14,232  14,232  14,232 14,232 14,232 14,232 14,232 14,232 
Notes: In addition to those reported on here, all of these regressions include controls for age, age squared, wealth quartiles, labor force status, income, marital 
status, sex, ethnicity, education, number of children and MSA controls.  The number of observations differs depending on the number of countries for which a 
particular measure of institutional quality is available.  A linear model is used and standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the 
country level.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  *** indicates significance at at least the 1% level, ** at at least the 5% level, * at at least the 10% level.   
  
Table 5A: The Effect of Institution Quality on the Probability of Having a Bank Relationship, Additional Country Controls  
 
Explanatory  Variable  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]  [7] 
Protection  from  Expropriation  0.027 ***  0.023 ***  0.023 ***  0.020 ***  0.019 **  0.029 **  0.030 *** 
  (0.005)    (0.007)   (0.005)    (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.008)    (0.008)   
Av. Per Capita GDP
†              2.490 **  2.470 **  -0.301   -3.290 ** 
            (1.180)   (1.150)   (1.090)    (1.370)   
English  Speaking               0.024    -0.020    -0.078  ** 
               (0.018)   (0.035)    (0.035)   
Bank  Freedom                  0.037  **  0.040  *** 
                  (0.015)    (0.014)   
Internet  Usage                      0.010  *** 
                      ( 0 . 0 0 2 )    
Religion  Controls  No    No   Yes   No   No    No   No   
                        
Continent  Controls  No    Yes   No   No   No    No   No   
                 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.2666   0.2697   0.2706   0.2687   0.2688    0.2877    0.2887   
Number of Observations  14,232    14,232   13,250   13,336   13,336    10,799    10,799   
Notes: In addition to those reported on here, all of these regressions include controls for age, age squared, wealth quartiles, labor force status, income, marital 
status, sex, ethnicity, education, number of children and MSA controls.  The number of observations differs depending on the number of countries for which a 
particular country characteristic is available.  A linear model is used and standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the country level.  
The reported coefficients and standard errors of explanatory variables marked by a † are the actual ones multiplied by 1,000,000.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  *** indicates significance at at least the 1% level, ** at at least the 5% level, * at at least the 10% level. 
  
 
Table 5B: The Effect of Institution Quality on Depth of Financial Market Participation, Additional Country Controls  
 
Explanatory  Variable  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]  [7] 
Protection  from  Expropriation  0.071 ***  0.056 ***  0.057 ***  0.044 ***  0.039 **  0.055 ***  0.056 *** 
  (0.012)    (0.015)   (0.013)    (0.016)   (0.017)   (0.014)    (0.014)   
Av. Per Capita GDP
†              8.730 ***  8.660 ***  7.170 ***  2.30  
            (2.770)   (2.760)   (2.620)    (3.260)   
English  Speaking               0.080  *  -0.0001    -0.095   
               (0.049)   (0.068)    (0.091)   
Bank  Freedom                  0.056  **  0.061  ** 
                  (0.026)    (0.026)   
Internet  Usage                      0.016   
                      ( 0 . 0 0 7 )   * *  
Religion  Controls  No    No   Yes   No   No    No   No   
                        
Continent  Controls  No    Yes   No   No   No    No   No   
                 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.3969   0.3997   0.3981   0.4043   0.4047    0.4179    0.4185   
Number of Observations  14,232    14,232   13,250   13,336   13,336    10,799    10,799   
 
Notes: In addition to those reported on here, all of these regressions include controls for age, age squared, wealth quartiles, labor force status, income, marital 
status, sex, ethnicity, education, number of children and MSA controls.  The number of observations differs depending on the number of countries for which a 
particular country characteristic is available.  A linear model is used and standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the country level.  
The reported coefficients and standard errors of explanatory variables marked by a † are the actual ones multiplied by 1,000,000.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  *** indicates significance at at least the 1% level, ** at at least the 5% level, * at at least the 10% level. 
 
  
Table 6: Does Enforcement Matter? 
Controlling for Unobserved Heterogeneity, Institution Quality and Ethnic Concentration  
 
  Probability of Having a Bank Relationship  Depth of Financial Market Participation 
Explanatory  Variable  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Protection from Expropriation * Ethnic Concentration  1.118***  0.827*  2.704***  2.422** 
  (0.300) (0.487) (0.604) (1.075) 
Ethnic Concentration  -8.638***  -5.734*  -20.989***  -18.090** 
  (2.225) (3.581) (4.516) (7.995) 
      
Country  Controls  No Yes  No Yes 
      
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.2626 0.2754 0.3914 0.4104 
Number  of  Observations  13,867 13,867 13,867 13,867 
Notes:  In addition to those reported on here, all of these regressions include controls for age, age squared, wealth quartiles, labor force status, income, marital 
status, sex, ethnicity, education, number of children and MSA controls.  A linear model is used and standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and 
clustering at the individual level.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  *** indicates significance at at least the 1% level, ** at at least the 5% level, * at at least 






















Drive own Car to 
Work 
[5] 
 Visited a Doctor 
in Past 12 
Months 
[6] 
Protection  from  Expropriation  0.016 ***  0.022 ***  0.024 ***  0.007 *  -0.003    0.002  
  (0.005)   (0.006)   (0.006)   (0.004)    (0.006)   (0.003)  
                
Mean of Dependent Variable  8.6%    40.1%    47.0%    8.7%    75.1%    79.3%   
                
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.2315   0.1835   0.2386    0.1090   0.0573   0.0035   
Number  of  Observations  14,232   14,232   14,232   14,231    7,546   8,705  
                
B.  Controlling for Unobserved Heterogeneity 
Protection from Expropriation x 
Ethnic Concentration  0.696 *  -0.282    1.625 ***  0.037 
 
  0.892   -0.268  
  (0.369)    (0.598)   (0.496)    (0.340)   (0.658)   (0.492)   
Ethnic  Concentration  -5.142 *  2.533   -12.004 ***  -0.400    -6.702    1.839   
  (2.757)   (4.417)   (3.665)    (2.499)   (4.820)   (3.619)   
Country  Controls  Yes   Yes   Yes    Yes   Yes   Yes   
Adjusted  R-squared  0.2599   0.1973   0.2492    0.1230   0.0682   0.0017   
Number  of  Observations  13,867   13,867   13,867   13,866    7,340   8,474  
Notes: In addition to those reported on here, all of these regressions include controls for age, age squared, wealth quartiles, labor force status, income, marital 
status, sex, ethnicity, education, number of children and MSA controls.  A linear model is used and standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and 
clustering at the country level.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  *** indicates significance at at least the 1% level, ** at at least the 5% level, * at at least the 
10% level.  “Checking Account” is equal to one if the respondent has a checking account that either does or does not pay interest.  “Savings Account” is equal to 
one if the respondent has a savings account and zero otherwise.  “Entrepreneur” is equal to one if the respondent is the owner or part-owner of a business, and 
zero otherwise.  “Drives own Car to Work” is asked of respondents who are employed or own a business and is equal to one if the respondent drives to work and 
is equal to zero otherwise.  “Visited a Doctor in the past 12 months” is equal to one if the responded visited a doctor in the 12 months before the survey question 
and zero otherwise.    
























Protection  from  Expropriation  0.027*** 0.022*** 0.044***  0.006 0.033*** 0.021*** 0.031*** 
  (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005) 
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.2666 0.1558 0.2453 0.1478 0.2482 0.1819 0.2281 
Depth of Financial Market Participation        
Protection  from  Expropriation  0.071*** 0.074*** 0.082*** 0.059*** 0.071*** 0.066*** 0.073*** 
  (0.012) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.014) (0.011) 
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.3969 0.3270 0.2875 0.3311 0.3060 0.3314 0.3688 
Number  of  Observations  14,232 2,842 5,127 1,984 2,408 5,829  10,199 
Notes:  In addition to those reported on here, all of these regressions include controls for age, age squared, wealth quartiles, labor force status, income, marital 
status, sex, ethnicity, education, number of children and MSA controls.  A linear model is used and standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and 
clustering at the country level.  High education immigrants are those with a bachelor’s degree or more education.  Low education immigrants are those with less 
than a high school degree.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  *** indicates significance at at least the 1% level, ** at at least the 5% level, * at at least the 10% 
level. “High Skill Workers” are workers whose 3-digit occupation code from SIPP is mapped into “Professional and Technical” or “Executive, Administrative, 
and Managerial” according to Bureau of Labor Statistics classifications.  “Low Skill Workers” include workers whose 3-digit occupation code from SIPP is 
similarly mapped into “Transportation and Material Moving Occupations”, “Handlers, Equipment Cleaners, Helpers and Laborers”, and “Service Occupations, 
Except Private Household”.  
 
   
 
Table 9: The Persistence of Institutions 




Probability of Bank Relationship    Years in the U.S. 
  ALL  1 – 7  8 – 12  13 – 17  18 – 27  28+ 
No Age at Arrival Controls        
Protection  from  Expropriation  0.027*** 0.022** 0.029**  0.023***  0.027***  0.012 
  (0.005) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) 
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.2666 0.3653 0.3168 0.3033 0.2653 0.2369 
Age at Arrival Controls        
Protection  from  Expropriation  0.027*** 0.022** 0.027**  0.022***  0.027***  0.010 
  (0.005) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) 
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.2673 0.3679 0.3191 0.3046 0.2656 0.2427 
Depth of Financial Market Participation  Years in the U.S. 
  ALL  1 – 7  8 – 12  13 – 17  18 – 27  28+ 
No Age at Arrival Controls        
Protection  from  Expropriation  0.071***  0.052** 0.078*** 0.081*** 0.083***  0.050* 
  (0.012) (0.023) (0.024) (0.019) (0.020) (0.029) 
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.3969 0.4293 0.4593 0.4369 0.4284 0.3967 
Age at Arrival Controls        
Protection  from  Expropriation  0.069***  0.052** 0.075*** 0.081*** 0.083***  0.039 
  (0.012) (0.022) (0.023) (0.020) (0.020) (0.028) 
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.3978 0.4312 0.4630 0.4364 0.4283 0.4012 
Number  of  Observations  14,232 2,619 2,192 2,145 2,750 2,955 
Notes: In addition to those reported on here, all of these regressions include controls for age, age squared, 
wealth quartiles, labor force status, income, marital status, sex, ethnicity, education, number of children and 
MSA controls.   A linear model is used and standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and 
clustering at the country level.  Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at at least the 
1% level, ** at at least the 5% level, * at at least the 10% level.  
Table 10: Learning about Institutions 




Probability of Bank Relationship    Age at Arrival in U.S. 
  ALL  1 – 15  16 – 20  21+ 
No Year of Arrival Controls        
Protection from Expropriation  0.027***  0.032***  0.026**  0.019*** 
  (0.005) (0.011) (0.013) (0.005) 
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.2666 0.3322 0.3319 0.2720 
Year of Arrival Controls        
Protection from Expropriation  0.028***  0.029**  0.025*  0.019*** 
  (0.005) (0.013) (0.013) (0.005) 
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.2698 0.3350 0.3319 0.2769 
Depth of Financial Market Participation  Age at Arrival in U.S. 
  ALL  1 – 15  16 – 20  21+ 
No Year of Arrival Controls        
Protection from Expropriation  0.071***  0.061***  0.061**  0.060*** 
  (0.012) (0.020) (0.029) (0.013) 
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.43969 0.4727 0.4344 0.4051 
Year of Arrival Controls        
Protection  from  Expropriation  0.071*** 0.054** 0.062**  0.061*** 
  (0.013) (0.022) (0.028) (0.014) 
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.4006 0.4742 0.4384 0.4126 
Number  of  Observations  14,232 1,677 1,639 7,963 
Notes: In addition to those reported on here, all of these regressions include controls for age, age squared, 
wealth quartiles, labor force status, income, marital status, sex, ethnicity, education, number of children, 
and MSA controls.   A linear model is used and standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and 
clustering at the country level.  Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at at least the 
1% level, ** at at least the 5% level, * at at least the 10% level.  
Table 11: Intergenerational Transmission of Institutional Lessons 
The Effect of Institution Quality on Financial Market Participation 
Selected Natives and Immigrants 
 
Probability of Bank Relationship  Native  Immigrant 
Protection from Expropriation  -0.0001  0.041*** 
 (0.012)  (0.010) 
    
Adjusted R-Squared  0.2226  0.2964 
Depth of Financial Market Participation  Native  Immigrant 
Protection from Expropriation  0.039  0.127*** 
 (0.038)  (0.029) 
    
Adjusted R-Squared  0.3666  0.4300 
Number of Observations  44,181  7,040 
Notes: In addition to those reported on here, all of these regressions include controls for age, age squared, 
wealth quartiles, labor force status, income, marital status, sex, ethnicity, education, number of children and 
MSA controls.   A linear model is used and standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and 
clustering at the country level.  Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at at least the 
1% level, ** at at least the 5% level, * at at least the 10% level.  The native-sample used in these estimates 
includes U.S. born individuals who identified their ancestral country as: Canada, France, the Netherlands, 
England, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Russia, Cuba, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic.  
The immigrant sample includes foreign-born individuals who were born in these same countries.  
Appendix Table 1: Ethnic Concentration and Number of observations per country 
 
 Country  Median  Ethnic 
Concentration (%) 
Number of Observations 
1 Argentina  0.0747%    96 
2 Australia  0.0580%  30 
3 Austria  0.0633%    64 
4 Bahamas,  The  ---  11 
5 Bangladesh  ---  40 
6 Belgium  0.0314%  21 
7 Bolivia  0.0479%  36 
8 Brazil  0.0965%  55 
9 Canada  0.6848%    392 
10 Chile  0.0717%  77 
11 China  0.8739%  595 
12 Colombia  0.7335%  217 
13 Costa  Rica  ---  34 
14 Cuba  17.3184%  617 
15 Czechoslovakia
36 0.1673%  38 
16 Denmark  0.0704%  7 
17 Dominican  Republic  1.5686%  267 
18 Ecuador  0.6477%  172 
19 Egypt  0.1477%  38 
20 El  Salvador  1.0890%  494 
21 England
37   0.5252%  419 
22 Ethiopia  0.0815%  5 
23 Finland  0.0145%  3 
24 France  0.1185%  88 
25  Germany (East and West)  0.4858%  373 
26 Ghana  ---  16 
27 Greece  0.3521%  124 
28 Guatemala  0.1697%  158 
29 Guyana  0.5743%  134 
30 Haiti  0.6296%  219 
31 Honduras  0.1611%  143 
32 Hong  Kong  0.1917%  139 
33 Hungary  0.1195%  72 
34 India  0.3301%  417 
35 Indonesia  0.1241%  1 
36 Iran  0.0987%  145 
37 Iraq  0.1540%  53 
38 Ireland  0.1394%  136 
39 Israel  0.1350%  53 
40 Italy  0.5840%  290 
41 Jamaica  1.0060%  318 
42 Japan  0.3189%  182 
43 Jordan  0.0270%  16 
44 Kenya  ---  7 
45 Korea,  South  0.5308%  438 
46 Lebanon  0.0330%  52 
                                                 
36 Includes individuals who reported that they were born in: Czechoslovakia, Slovakia, Czech Republic. 
37 Includes individuals who reported that they were born in: England, United Kingdom, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland.  
Appendix Table 1: Ethnic Concentration and Number of observations per country, 
continued 
 
 Country  Median  Ethnic 
Concentration (%) 
Number of Observations 
47 Malaysia  0.0232%  19 
48 Mexico  8.5920%  4,163 
49 Morocco  ---  6 
50 Myanmar  ---  23 
51 Netherlands  0.1492%  46 
52 New  Zealand  0.0027%  3 
53 Nicaragua  0.3377%  81 
54 Nigeria  0.0562%  39 
55 Norway  0.0386%  19 
56 Pakistan  0.0764%  84 
57 Panama  0.0652%  26 
58 Peru  0.2147%  108 
59 Philippines  1.8140%  916 
60 Poland  0.7874%  249 
61 Portugal  0.3592%  88 
62 Romania  0.0873%  52 
63 Russia
38 0.4919%  365 
64 Singapore  0.0130%  3 
65 South  Africa  0.0297%  24 
66 Spain  0.1249%  66 
67 Sweden  0.0388%  29 
68 Switzerland  0.0464%  16 
69 Syria  0.0511%  42 
70 Taiwan  0.2270%  216 
71 Thailand  0.0547%  79 
72 Trinidad  &  Tobago  0.4149%  131 
73 Turkey  0.0555%  15 
74 Uruguay  0.0644%  7 
75 Venezuela  0.3400%  46 
76 Vietnam  0.7256%  663 
77 Yugoslavia
39 0.1243%  117 
 All  0.7829%  15,043 
 
                                                 
38 Includes individuals who reported that they were born in: Russia, Armenia, Azerbijan, the Baltic States, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyztan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, USSR, Uzebekistan. 
39 Includes individuals who reported that they were born in: Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzogovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Slovenia, Serbia.  
Appendix Table 2: The Effect of Control Variables on the Probability of Having a 







Having a Bank 
Relationship 
[1] 





†  0.704 ***  1.818 *** 
  (0.153)   (0.394)  
Age Squared
†  -0.004 ***  -0.015 *** 
  (0.002)   (0.004)  
2
nd  Wealth  Quartile  0.183 ***  0.331 *** 
  (0.015)   (0.029)  
3
rd Wealth Quartile  0.173  ***  0.444  *** 
  (0.017)   (0.044)  
4
th Wealth Quartile  0.168  ***  0.689  *** 
  (0.019)   (0.048)  
Unemployed or Out of Labor Force  -0.086  ***  -0.073  ** 
  (0.013)   (0.032)  
Per Capita Income
††  37.900 ***  115.200 *** 
  (8.540)   (16.300)  
Per Capita Income Squared
††  -0.001 ***  -0.003 *** 
  (0.000)   (0.001)  
Male    -0.050 ***  -0.120 *** 
  (0.007)   (0.017)  
Married  0.163 ***  0.302 *** 
  (0.014)   (0.029)  
Number  of  Children  -0.022 ***  -0.046 *** 
  (0.005)   (0.014)  
Non-white  0.019   0.012  
  (0.018)   (0.041)  
High  School  Graduate  0.126 ***  0.235 *** 
  (0.015)   (0.022)  
Some  College  0.187 ***  0.404 *** 
  (0.015)   (0.033)  
Bachelor  Degree  0.200 ***  0.449 *** 
  (0.018)   (0.046)  
Advance  Degree  0.189 ***  0.595 *** 
  (0.021)   (0.049)  
Protection  from  Expropriation  0.027 ***  0.071 *** 
  (0.005)   (0.012)  
Constant    -0.115 ***  -0.731 *** 
 (0.056)    (0.119)   
MSA Controls  Yes    Yes   
        
Adjusted R-Squared  0.2666    0.3969   
Number of Observations  14,232    14,232   
Notes: A linear model is used and standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the 
country level.  Standard errors are in parentheses. The reported coefficients and standard errors of 
explanatory variables marked by a † are the actual ones multiplied by 100, by a †† are multiplied by 
1,000,000.  The lowest wealth quartile is the omitted wealth category, and the omitted education category is 
less than high school graduate.  *** indicates significance at at least the 1% level, ** at at least the 5% 
level, * at at least the 10% level. 
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